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Note
Torts Prior to Conception:
A New Theory of Liability
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351
N.E.2d 870 (1976); Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387
N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, an unborn child was deemed to have no inherent
rights in the field of torts,' although such rights were granted in
areas such as property or criminal law when it proved beneficial to
the child.2 Case law relating to tort liability for the benefit of
infants, however, has expanded rapidly in recent years.
This note will summarize the law3 of torts which harm infants,
with special focus on an area just beginning to emerge-that of
liability for torts committed prior to an infant's conception.
The area of preconceptional torts has been discussed in connec-
tion with radiation injuries caused by another's negligent conduct,
4
1. See, e.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900);
Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Drabbels v. Skelley Oil
Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951) (representing the Nebraska
view).
2. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946); Zepeda
v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 248, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). See generally A. MImUNSKY & G. ANNAS,
GENxrCS AND THE LAW, 29 (1976); A. WILKERSON, THE RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN-EMEBGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW AND SociETY 49-60 (1973);
Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Incon-
sistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 351-54, 362-69 (1971); 18 S.D.L.
REV. 204, 204-05 n.7, 213 n.74 (1973).
3. See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1441 (1968); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d
1222 (1971).
4. For example, a parent could be exposed to radioactive materials, which
could damage his chromosomal structure, and injure the child once
conceived. Radiation damages have been alleged in at least one un-
reported federal district court case. See Estep & Forgotson, Legal Lia-
bility for Genetic Injuries from Radiation, 24 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2
(1963). Especially with the probability of more nuclear activity in
the future, the threats of more radiation damages are very real in-
deed. See generally Estep & Forgotson id; Comment, Radiation and
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and in the area of genetics and genetic screening.5 Preconception-
al tort injuries are those by which the negligent conduct occurs
prior to the conception of the child.6 The injury attaches to either
the father or mother but does not harm him or her. However, the
harm attaches immediately to the child at conception. Thus, by
the time the child is born, an injury has occurred from an act that
took place prior to conception, but that has left him to suffer its
consequences throughout the remainder of his life.
Tort law has long abided by the theory that for every wrong
there is a remedy.7 Although a whole new horizon could emerge
if preconceptional tort recovery is permitted, the children injured
by such torts have been wronged and should not be denied recov-
ery merely because they were not in being at the time the tort was
committed. The traditional tort elements of negligence can be
applied very exactly to this area to allow the needed recovery:
[I]f recovery is denied, we know that many individuals often
through no fault of their own, will go through life uncompensated
for the infirmity, inconvenience, and financial sacrifice caused by
another's actions for which he would be legally liable but for the
lack of an identifiable legal entity and specific proof of causal con-
nection. This loss will be no less painful, costly, or real because
the wrongful impact occurred before conception.8
The area of preconceptional torts cannot be considered without
a discussion of the area of prenatal injuries and wrongful life, for a
suit based on a preconceptional tort must arise out of, and be
brought under either of these two theories.
Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 414 (1974).
5. See A. MILUNSKY & G. ANNAS, supra note 2; Annas & Coyne, "Fitness"
for Birth and Reproduction: Legal Implications of Genetic Screening,
9 FAm. L.Q. 463 (1975); Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic
Counseling: A Dissent to the "Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J.
581 (1973); Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The
Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U.L. Rmv. 696 (1973)..
6. Preconception injuries were first discussed in Morgan v. United States,
143 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1956) (dismissed on the ground of a two
year statute of limitations and on the now reversed Pennsylvania
doctrine disallowing all claims for prenatal injuries). See also Zepeda
v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 250-51, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (dicta); Hornbuckle v. Plantation
Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 506, 93 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1956) (concurring
opinion).
7. The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those
who by their wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded
the right of an individual .... And what right is more in-
herent, and more sacrosanct, than that of the individual in his
possession and enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his body?
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946).
8. Estep & Forgotson, supra note 4, at 46.
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This note examines two recent cases in the area of preconcep-
tional torts: Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,9 which involved
prenatal injuries incurred from a negligent preconceptional act,
and Park v. Chessin,'0 which concerned a suit in wrongful life
arising out of a negligent preconceptional act. The scope of this
note will be limited to an anlysis of the cause of action accruing in
favor of the infant, through an application of the elements of
negligence.'1
II. PRECONCEPTIONAL TORT RESULTING
IN PRENATAL INJURIES
In Renslow,' 2 the infant plaintiff, through her mother, brought
an action against a hospital and physician for prenatal, personal
injuries sustained by her because of a negligent blood transfusion
to her mother some eight years prior to her birth. In 1965, when
the mother was 13 years old, she was given two transfusions of
blood in the defendant hospital. The transfusions were of the
wrong blood type, and caused the sensitization of her blood. This
fact was not discovered until eight years later during routine testing
of blood during her pregnancy. The physicians determined that
the life of the infant plaintiff was in danger, and they induced
labor, which resulted in a premature live birth of the plaintiff.
9. 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
10. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
11. Although both Renslow and Park involve claims by the parents for
their own expenses and mental suffering, those causes of action will
not be discussed. For cases focusing on the parents' causes of action
rather than that of the child, see Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d
303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Cox v.
Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Bowman v.
Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766,
233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514,
219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
Although this note is limited to the cause of action accruing in favor
of an infant born alive, an equally debatable issue today is the wrong-
ful death damages accruing in favor of infants stillborn. See State v.
Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App.
390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 465, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975);
Yow v. Nance, 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, cert. denied, 290 N.C.
312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976) (no causes of action accruing in favor of the
infants for wrongful death actions); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924
(Okla. 1976); Presley v. Newport Hospital, 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976)
(allowing causes of action in wrongful death for negligence causing
the infants to be stillborn).
12. 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
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Plaintiff was born suffering personal injuries which included per-
manent damages to her nervous system and brain.
The appellate court held that a cause of action existed on the
behalf of the infant for any injuries sustained as a result of the
negligent transfusion, even though it occurred several years prior to
the child's conception. 13 Before an analysis of the court's decision,
a history of prenatal injuries is necessary.
A prenatal injury is one suffered by a child while yet unborn,
the extent of which cannot become known until after birth.14 The
claim in such cases is that "but for" the defendant's negligence, the
child would have been born a normal child.15 The plaintiff has
the burden of showing that the defendant's conduct was the direct
cause of injury. If the plaintiff meets this burden, damages are
measured by comparing the child as he exists to the normal child
he would have been.' 6
The first case deciding this issue was Dietrich v. North-
hampton.1 7  The case involved a woman who miscarried as a
result of her fall on a defective highway. The child lived for only a
few moments. The court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, held
that a child subsequently born alive would have no cause of action
for injuries sustained by him while in his mother's womb. The
court ruled that the unborn child was not viewed as having an
independent existence apart from his mother.'8 This precedent
remained until 1946. The theory that a child had no separate
existence, however, had been questioned as early as 1900. In
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,19 a viable fetus was injured by the
negligent operation of an elevator by the hospital in which the
mother was riding. Although the majority followed Dietrich, a dis-
sent argued for recognition of prenatal rights in a viable unborn
child if later born alive.
20
The reversal of Dietrich came in 1946. Bonbrest v. Katz
2'
13. Id. at 240, 351 N.E.2d at 874.
14. "Occurring, existing or taking place before birth." WEBSTER'S THni
NEw WoRLD DIcTIONARY 1790 (1971).
15. Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8
ST. MARY'S L.J. 140, 156-58 (1976) (describing prenatal injuries and
distinguishing them from suits brought in wrongful life discussed in
text accompanying note 42 infra).
16. Id. at 156-57.
17. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
18. Id. at 15.
19. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
20. Id. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
21. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). Although Bonbrest has traditionally
been known for the reversal of Dietrich, a state court in 1924 accom-
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held a physician liable for injuries to a viable fetus when brought in
a tort action by the child after his birth. The decision thus began a
trend that completely rejected the Dietrich view. Bonbrest empha-
sized the various inconsistencies in the property, criminal and tort
laws as applied to the unborn. 22 Bonbrest, however, allowed
recovery to the child only if there was direct injury to him, if he
survived birth and if he was viable23 at the time of the injury.
The viability standard withstood attack for several years, but it
began to be disregarded as an arbitrary basis in Hornbunkle v.
Plantation Pipe Lines. 24 There, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that a child prenatally injured anytime after conception could
recover if subsequently born alive.25 The modern trend of courts
considering the viability question appears to allow recovery for the
child regardless of when the injury occurred as long as the child is
subsequently born alive.
26
plished the same purpose, by allowing recovery for the infant, injured
when viable. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
22. 65 F. Supp. at 140. For cases and articles concerning more in depth
analysis of the property and criminal rights of infants, see note 2
supra.
23. Viability is defined as "[c]apability of living. A term used to denote
the power a new-born child possesses of continuing its independent
existence." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1737 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
24. 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956). The arbitrariness of the viability
standard was best described by Professor Prosser:
Viability of course does not affect the question of the legal
existence of the foetus, and therefore of the defendant's duty;
and it is a most unsatisfactory criterion, since it is a relative
matter, depending on the health of mother and child and many
other matters in addition to the stage of development. Cer-
tainly the infant may be no less injured; and all logic is in
favor of ignoring the stage at which it occurs.
W. P OSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 55, at 337 (4th ed.
1971) (footnotes omitted).
25. 212 Ga. at 505, 93 S.E.2d at 728. The concurring opinion in Horn-
buckle was one of the first to raise the preconception issue: "If a
baby can sue for injuries sustained five seconds after conception, as
the majority rules, why not allow such suits for injuries before con-
ception, even unto the third and fourth generations?" Id. at 506, 93
S.E.2d at 729 (Duckworth, C.J., concurring).
26. For a complete listing as of that date of the states still adhering to
the viability standard and those that have abandoned it, see 18 S.D.L.
REv. 204, 204-05 n.7, 213 n.74 (1973). Since that writing, Florida, in
Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976), has joined the states abandoning the viability standard.
It has been encouraged that all courts should abandon the arbitrary
viability standard, especially since it is apparent that the most vital
stages of development, and thus the stages in which the most phys-
ical harm can occur to the infant are the first three months of de-
velopment. See Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law
Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 563 (1962).
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Thus, the questions faced by the courts are: (1) if the major
concern is to give a remedy to a child for a wrong done by
another's negligence, should viability or any other point in time bar
a remedy, and (2) should the recovery be different if the injury
took place prior to conception but all the necessary elements of
negligence can be shown? 27  The court in Renslow, although
allowing the child recovery, basically avoided these issues.
The court first rejected the case the defendants contended was
controlling-Morgan v. United States. 28  Morgan appears to be
the first case to consider the preconceptional tort issue. The fact
situation was very similar to that in Renslow, and the court found
that no cause of action accrued in favor of the child. Pennsylvania
at that time, however, followed Dietrich and allowed no recovery
for any type of prenatal injury. Renslow, therefore, properly
rejected Morgan, in light of the fact that Pennsylvania no longer
follows Dietrich29 and in light of the fact that Illinois courts have
allowed recovery for prenatal injuries.
30
Renslow relied on Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories,3 1
a case that allowed a cause of action for preconception injuries. In
Jorgensen, a woman had taken oral contraceptives prior to the
conception of her twin daughters. The parents, being the plain-
tiffs in the action, asserted that these contraceptives had damaged
the chromosomal structure of the mother, which created a mongo-
loid deformity in the viable fetuses of the daughters, causing death
to one, and severe injuries to the other. The court found that there
27. Dictum in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964), was directed to this very point:
But what if the wrongful conduct takes place before con-
ception? Can the defendant be held accountable if his act
was completed before the plaintiff was conceived? Yes, for
it is possible to incur, as Justice Holmes phrased it in the
Dietrich case, "a conditional prospective liability in tort
to one not yet in being." It makes no difference how much
time elapses between a wrongful act and a resulting injury
if there is a causal relation between them.
Id. at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 853.
28. 143 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1956).
29. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (allowing re-
covery for prenatal injuries).
30. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953). See generally
51 CHL-KENT L. Rsv. 227, 229-31 (1974) (summary of Illinois law in
the area).
31. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). Jorgensen has received relatively little
attention from commentators probably because it, too, tended to avoid
the main issues. See generally Comment, supra note 4, at 418; Com-
ment, supra note 15, at 148; A. MILTNSKY & G. ANNAS, supra note
2, at 6.
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was a cause of action on the ground that the injury was to a viable
fetus. The court stated that, "the pleading should not be con-
strued as being limited to the effects of developments before con-
ception."3 2  Thus, even though the tortious conduct took place
prior to conception, the court treated it as a prenatal, personal
injury suit.
33
Renslow followed similar reasoning. Although the injury can-
not attach to the child until conception, the court only superficially
considered the elements of negligence necessary to sustain the
action, and particularly seemed to avoid the preconception issue.
Regardless of the somewhat superficial reasoning apparent in
Renslow, the result should be a worthy precedent for other actions
brought on a theory of preconceptional tort. The court supported
Jorgensen in reaffirming the proposition that the time factor for
tortious conduct may be extended not only to anytime after concep-
tion, but also to anytime prior to conception if resulting injury and
causation can be proved. This decision further established the fact
that a theory for preconceptional torts is becoming more tenable.
Renslow recognized that a great injury had been done to the
child by the doctor's negligence, and that had the correct blood
been transfused eight years before, a normal child could have been
born. Because of this preconceptional tort, the court reasoned that
harm by way of a prenatal injury had attached to the child. The
chain of causation was definite, and the court was correct in
allowing a recovery.
III. PRECONCEPTIONAL TORT RESULTING
IN WRONGFUL LIFE SUIT
The claim in Park v. Chessin34 was brought for the infant
plaintiff Lara, by the mother and father as legal representatives for
their child, who lived for two and one-half years, but was deceased
at the time of the action. The child suffered from polycystic
kidneys, an hereditary disease. The suit was brought in wrongful
life35 by the infant, for pain and suffering sustained by the child
after her birth.
32. 483 F.2d at 239.
33. See Comment, supra note 15, at 148 (critisism of the Jorgensen de-
cision).
34. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
35. For background in the wrongful life area, see Tedeschi, On Tort Lia-
bility for "Wrongful Life," 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966); Note, 55 MINN,
L. REv 58 (1970).
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The mother had given birth to another child before Lara. That
child also died of polycystic kidneys shortly after birth. After the
death of the first child, the defendants, specialists in the field of
obstetrics, advised the parents that there was no reason why a
future pregnancy would result in a congenitally defective child.
The parents asserted that the defendants failed to take the neces-
sary genetic tests to ascertain the probability that it was a heredi-
tary disease, which in fact it was, and entirely on the defendant's
advice, the parents did conceive another child. The court denied
the motion to dismiss, and allowed the cause of action for a
preconceptional injury brought in wrongful life.36
The suit in this case was for wrongful life, not for prenatal
injuries. The distinction between the two is an important one. A
wrongful life action is distinguished from an action for prenatal
injuries37 in that it is brought when the defendant did not cause the
actual injury himself, but his conduct was a cause contributing to
the plaintiff's conception and birth. The tortious conduct asserted
in wrongful life actions is that the defendant should have known
and advised the parents that for a particular reason a normal child
could never have been born-and thus have given an option to the
parents to abort if the child was already conceived, or not to
conceive in the first instance. 38 A wrongful life action seeks
damages for the birth itself, rather than for a distinct injury caused
prior to birth.39
36. To allow a cause of action for such a suit is worthy in itself:
If one considers that the so-called "unborn plaintiff," one who
was conceived but not yet born at the time of the injury, has
only within the last thirty years been allowed recovery for
prenatal injuries, it becomes apparent that a major legal
change is required to allow the unconceived plaintiff a cause
of action.
Comment, supra note 4, at 418 (footnotes omitted).
37. See note 15 supra.
38. Since the decedent's conception took place after the alleged
tort committed by defendants, and since the child was a po-
tential being with essential reality at the time of the act, for
she belonged to a class which defendants could foresee and
had in contemplation when they made the alleged misrepre-
sentation to the mother and committed the alleged tort, de-
fendants had in view the decedent.... Why, therefore, un-
der such circumstances should not the plaintiff decedent be
permitted to hold these defendants in damages, since the de-
fendants' wrongful acts are alleged to have caused the pro-
creation of the being whom they intended and ultimately in-
jured[?]
88 Misc. 2d at -, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (emphasis supplied).
39. For a suggested analysis of how damages can be determined in wrong-
ful life cases, see Note, supra note 35, at 62-67.
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Wrongful life suits have not been favored by the courts for a
variety of reasons. 40 A reflection upon the variety of suits brought
under wrongful life will demonstrate some of the problems with
which the courts have been faced.
The first case to consider a wrongful life suit seriously was
Zepeda v. Zepeda.4 ' That case involved a suit by an infant son
seeking damages against his father because he was an illegitimate
child. The court recognized that a wrong had been done to the
child but refused a cause of action for public policy reasons:
Recognition of the plaintiff's claim means creation of a new
tort: a cause of action for wrongful life. The legal implications of
such a tort are vast, the social implications would be staggering.
... Encouragement would extend to all others born into the
world under conditions they might regard as adverse.
42
Dictum in that case, however, strongly supported the proposition
that if physical injury of some kind were inflicted on a child prior
to his conception, he should be granted a cause of action.
43
The first case brought in wrongful life for actual physical
injuries rejected the cause of action so emphatically that it has been
40. Four courts have explicitly rejected the wrongful life actions when
brought by the infant. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190
N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (cause of action
denied for public policy reasons); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967) (denied cause of action because damages were
found to be too uncertain); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp.,
35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695,
283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (denied cause of action be-
cause of lack of precedent); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223
N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (denied cause of action because
of lack of precedent).
41. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964).
42. Id. at 259-60, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
43. So let us go still further and take a third suppositive case,
where the wrongful act also takes place before conception but
the injury attaches at the moment of conception .... If a
child is born malformed or an imbecile because of the genetic
effect on his father or mother of a negligently or intentionally
caused atomic explosion, will he be denied recovery because
he was not in being at the time of the explosion?
Id. at 256-61, 190 N.E.2d at 854.
Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 483, 223 N.E.2d 343, 344, 296
N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1966), involved another illegitimacy case where the
infant plaintiff claimed negligence of the state in failing to provide the
proper care and protection for his mother in a mental hospital, which
resulted in a rape upon the mentally deficient mother, causing the
plaintiff to be born illigitimate. The court of appeals held that to
allow recovery they would have to invent a new ground for suit, that
the damages of being illegitimate could not be measured and also
found it difficult to owe a duty to one not yet in being.
PRECONCEPTIONAL TORTS
relied upon by other courts to deny a cause of action. In Gleitman
v. Cosgrove,4 the allegations of negligence were that the doctors
failed to advise Mrs. Gleitman that she might give birth to a
deformed child because of her contraction of rubella (German
measles) during her pregnancy. As a result of this negligence, she
did not seek an abortion and subsequently gave birth to a deformed
child.45 The difficulty the plaintiffs in Gleitman and in several
later cases4 6 confronted, but not present in Park, is that the child
was already conceived when a doctor was consulted. All of these
cases, thus, had to consider abortion, which was not then legal,47 as
the only alternative that the parent could have taken to prevent the
birth of their possibly deformed child. In these instances," the
courts found no cause of action because even if the doctors had
informed the mother of the possibility that her child might have
some sort of physical or mental injury, an abortion would have
been illegal, and there was no plausible way the child could not
have been born. One of the reasons, therefore, why the wrongful
life suit presented in Park seems to be more plausible is that the
doctors' negligence did not occur after conception, but rather,
plaintiffs assert it was on the doctors' explicit misrepresentations
that they decided to conceive another child.
49
44. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
45. Although based somewhat on public policy reasons, the major thrust
of the court's holding was that to ascertain damages in such a case
they would have to compare the child as it existed then to non-
existence, since the child sought damages for life itself. The court
denied that damages could be measured by comparing the child with
a normal child because that was not the option. The child in
suing for wrongful life, was asking for a value to be placed on
.,non-existence" which the court concluded could not be done.
This Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments
against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting that he
should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it log-
ically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages
because of the impossibility of making the comparison re-
quired by compensatory remedies.
Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
46. Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.
2d 502 (1970), aSf'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640
(1972); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d
372 (1975).
47. Abortion was not held to be constitutional until Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
48. See note 46 supra.
49. Other wrongful life cases have recently been brought seeking dam-
ages for life based on unsuccessful sterilization operations resulting
in the birth of a child. These cases, although interesting are not par-
ticularly relevant to the issue at hand since they involve the birth
of a healthy child, and are suits merely to get damages for the ex-
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The court in Park relied on two basic theories which warranted
a cause of action. The first theory was that a defendant could owe
a duty to one not yet in being. The court, relying upon Zepeda,
stated that "[i]t makes no difference how much time elapses
between a wrongful act and a resulting injury if there is a causal
relation between them." 50 It also relied on Piper v. Hoard,51 where
a woman over twenty years of age was permitted to maintain an
action for financial damages suffered by her as a result of a fraud
perpetrated on her mother before the mother's marriage and her
own conception.
52
The court in Park found the other New York cases dealing
with wrongful life53 not dispositive of the issue because they in-
volved wrongful life actions brought for negligence occurring after
the infants' conceptions.
The second theory relied upon in Park, was that for every
proven wrong there should be a remedy, and every child that can
prove such a wrong ought to be compensated just as anyone else
would be compensated for personal injuries. "[N] atural justice
... requires recognition of the legal right of every human being to
begin life unimpaired by physical or mental defects resulting from
the negligence of another."
54
pense of raising that child. See LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118
(W.D. Tex. 1976); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1976); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Aronoff v.
Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J.
Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
50. 41 Ill. App. 2d at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 853.
51. 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887).
52. It is true, the plaintiff was not born when the fraudulent
representations were made. Still they were made by defend-
ant to plaintiff's mother for the purpose of inducing a mar-
riage between her parents, and, if they had been true, the
plaintiff would have been the owner of this particular prop-
erty. In this way she is the very person injured by the fraud,
and, although not individually in the mind of defendant when
he perpetrated that fraud, yet . . . she belongs to the class
which defendant had in contemplation . . . In this way it
may be claimed that defendant had in view the plaintiff, and
the rights he alleged she would have. Why should not the
plaintiff be permitted to hold the defendant to his representa-
tions?
Id. at 79-80, 13 N.E. at 630.
53. Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976);
Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d
502 (1970), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
54. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903, 301 N.
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The court in Park also considered the other traditional objec-
tions to the wrongful life cause of action. On the damage issue,
the court determined that although damages were speculative, they
were no more so than in any other personal injury suit.55 The
public policy argument was not found to be compelling in Park.
"Although fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation are,
of course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a
measure of its jurisdiction."56
The wrongful life cause of action was correctly allowed in Park
because it was not the type of action that would open the flood-
gates for all types of wrongful life suits. It would serve as prece-
dent for only a limited type of case: (1) where the child suffers
physical injury because of the defendant's negligence and misrepre-
sentations, and (2) where the plaintiff can establish the direct
chain of causation from the preconceptional tort to the resulting
injury.
Park indicated that other courts have long put off a valid cause
of action for wrongful life because it appeared to be novel. Recog-
nizing that plaintiffs must sustain their burden of proof at a trial on
the merits, the court allowed an important action for a preconcep-
tional tort to be brought in wrongful life.
IV. PRECONCEPTION INJURIES-PROOF PROBLEMS
AND PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS
A. Elements of Negligence as Applied to a Preconceptional Tort
Although Renslow and Park approached the preconception
issue from different perspectives, each recognized that the child
had been damaged by another's negligence and therefore should be
compensated for that damage
7
Y.S.2d 65, 68-69 (1969). The court also relied on Batalla v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961): "It is funda-
mental to our common-law system that one may seek redress for
every substantial wrong." I& at 240, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d
at 36.
55. 88 Misc. 2d at -, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
56. Id. at -, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
57. The statute of limitations has not proven to be a problem in the few
preconceptional cases brought, such as Renslow, where the injury
took place eight years after the initial tortious conduct. The reason
for this is that when an injury is not discoverable for a certain period
of time following a tort, the statute does not begin to run until the
injury occurs.
Quite recently there have been a wave of decisions meeting
the issue head-on, and holding that the statute will no longer
be construed as intended to run until the plaintiff has in fact
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Although both courts applied tort elements of negligence to the
preconception issue, a further analysis is necessary. In any negli-
gence action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a
duty to the plaintiff to exercise the required care and skill, that the
duty was breached, and that the plaintiff was injured as a foreseea-
ble result of that breach,58
The first factor to be considered is that of the standard of care
required of the defendants. In the cases referred to in this note,59
the defendants were either hospitals or physicians. A physician,
because of his specialized training, is required not only to exercise
reasonable care, but also to act in accordance with at least the
minimum standards of his specialized knowledge and ability.60
The next consideration is whether the defendant owed a duty
of care to the plaintiff. Courts for years have been involved in the
issue of whether one can owe a duty to another not yet in being.6 '
On first analysis, the initial reaction might be that no duty exists.
Recent decisions, however, have held no bar.62 A defendant can
owe a duty to anyone who is "foreseeable." 63 It does not necessar-
ily follow that a person has to be living or even conceived at the
discovered he has suffered injury, or by the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence, should have discovered it.
W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 144. Another recent case, Shack v.
Holland, - Misc. 2d -, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1976), further
allowed an action on behalf of an individual who was negligently
injured some 22 years prior to bringing suit, when the plaintiff was a
nonviable fetus. The court allowed recovery of damages from the
physicians because the statute of limitation period had tolled during
his minority.
58. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 245, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513
(1971).
59. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973); Morgan v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 58 (D.N.J. 1956);
Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976);
Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
60. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 32, at 161. "Upon the same basis, a
physician who is possessed of unusual skill or knowledge must use
care which is reasonable in the light of his special ability and in-
formation, and may be negligent where an ordinary doctor would
not." Id.
61. This discussion began with the prenatal injury cases discussed supra,
as to whether a duty could be owed to one conceived and not born,
and has continued to include those not yet conceived.
62. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d
870 (1976); Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup.
Ct. 1976).
63. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 43, at 250.
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time to be "foreseeable" to the defendant. An example proposed 64
might serve to demonstrate the point. A baby food manufacturer
produced baby food prior to a child's conception. The company
was negligent in the manufacture, and a year later a baby was
seriously harmed by eating the defective food. The child was not
even conceived at the time of the tortious conduct, but yet that
child was clearly foreseeable to the manufacturer at the time of
production.
In both Renslow and Park there were excellent arguments that
indeed the child was foreseeable to the defendants. The court in
Renslow stated:
such conduct on the part of the defendants caused damage to
the unborn infant which resulted in permanent physical injuries
to the infant. We emphasize that the defendants are a doctor and
a hospital. There has been no showing that the defendants could
not reasonably have foreseen that the teenage girl would later
marry and bear a child and that the child would be injured as
the result of the improper blood transfusion. 65
Further, in Park, the foreseeability of the infant to the physicians
was just as great, where the parents on the very advice and mis-
representation of the defendants did in fact conceive the plaintiff.06
If a duty of care to the unconceived infant can be found, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant breached that duty and as a
foreseeable result of that breach the plaintiff was injured.6 7 A
breach can be shown by comparing the action of the defendant to
other individuals in similar circumstances to ascertain whether the
defendant acted within the reasonable limits of his discretion.
Concerning the fact situation presented in Renslow, few would
argue that the transfusion of the wrong type of blood was not a
breach of the duty of care. In Renslow, it seemed that the
defendants themselves were aware that their breach had caused
injury to the infant. This is shown by the fact that immediately
upon discovering the sensitization of the mother's blood, labor was
induced because "medical diagnosis determined that the life of her
unborn child was in jeopardy."
68
In Park, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendants
knew or should have known the parents were potential carriers of
the disease, and that tests were available to determine if they were
64. See James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 778,
788 (1953).
65. 40 Ill. App. 3d at 239, 351 N.E.2d at 874.
66. 88 Misc. 2d at -, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
67. See James, supra note 64, at 785, 788.
68. 40 Ill. App. 3d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 871.
720 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 3 (1977)
carriers. 9 She then would have to prove that there was a direct
chain between the negligence of the doctors and the resulting
injury. She would have to prove that were it not for the doctor's
negligence, the parents would never have conceived.
If the doctor's negligence were pre-conceptional, then the plain-
tiff would have to show that she would have taken steps to avoid
becoming pregnant or that if she did become pregnant, she would
have had the pregnancy terminated unless additional tests showed
that the fetus would not be afflicted with the defective genetic
condition.7
0
The last factor in the plaintiff's case requires proof that some
damage cognizable at law was suffered. In Park, and Renslow
both infants suffered extreme physical injuries. The injuries suf-
fered by these plaintiffs involved none of the remoteness of injury
involved in the illegitimacy cases 71 or those involving healthy, but
unwanted children. 72 The courts in prenatal preconception cases
need to compare the child as he exists to a normal child. As in
any other personal injury suit, recovery should be allowed for the
real expenses involved, including pain and suffering.
73
If brought under wrongful life, the difficulty of assessing dam-
ages, which appeared to be a barrier in Gleitman,7 4 should be
avoided. The plaintiff in Park explicitly asked for pain and suffer-
ing damages caused by the tortious conduct before her conception,
resulting in wrongful life.7 5
B. Public Policy Considerations
Because it can be shown that all negligence elements are appli-
cable to preconceptional tort injury cases,7 6 the lack of precedent
69. 88 Misc. 2d at -, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
70. Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 755.
71. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 fli. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223
N.E.2d 343, 296 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
72. See note 59 supra.
73. See Comment, supra note 15, at 156-58.
74. 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
75. It should still be possible, however, in a case involving great
individual suffering, to determine that a child's not having
been born would have been preferable to a life with extreme
disabilities. Although damages would be difficult to deter-
mine, as they are in many other types of cases, the fixing of
damages for a particular individual in a particular fact situa-
tion should not be so difficult as to constitute an unsurmount-
able barrier to recovery.
Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 765.
76. For a good discussion of how the wrongful life cases fit within the
traditional framework of tort law, see Note, supra note 35. Many of
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should be no bar to recovery. Prosser stated that a lack of pre-
precedent is not sufficient reason for denying a cause of action.
71
Tort law, historically, has grown from judicial rather than legisla-
tive action. This is because the type of conduct in a tort makes it
unlikely that advance notice to prospective tortfeasors would deter
wrongful acts. Also it is difficult to anticipate all the different
factual situations where torts may arise.
78
Some imaginative thinking is needed by modem courts to allow
recovery in preconceptional injury cases. Professor Keeton, in his
article on "creative continuity" states:
Any legal system, to remain viable over a span of time, must have
the flexibility to admit change. To find solutions for a succes-
sion of differing problems in a continuously changing context,
it must be creative .... Creativity must build upon a solid founda-
tion of continuity. Modern developments in tort law present acute-
ly the problem of accommodation of these competing demands for
change and stabilityjS
C. Status of the Law in Nebraska
The Nebraska courts have not had the occasion to hear an
infant injury case since Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.80 The court in
that decision followed the Dietrich view which rejected any cause
of action on behalf of the infant. Because every court presented
with this issue in recent years has overruled the Dietrich rationale,
it would appear that Nebraska would do so also. It is not suggest-
ed, however, that the Nebraska Supreme Court would adopt a
cause of action for a preconceptional injury without first modifying
the Drabbels view. It is recommended, however, that when Ne-
braska is presented with such an issue, its courts permit recovery
for a child harmed by another's negligence, even if the child was
not in existence at the time of the tort.
V. CONCLUSION
As in any negligence action, the elements of an action for a tort
committed prior to conception must be demonstrated by the plain-
the same points for wrongful life apply equally well in the precon-
ception area.
77. W. PRossER, supra note 24, § 54, at 327-28. "It is the business of the
courts to make precedent where a wrong calls for redress .. " Id.
at 328.
78. 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 212 (1966).
79. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. Rzv.
463, 463 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
80. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
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tiff. There have been inequities in infant tort law for many years,
when infants were denied causes of action even though the ele-
ments of negligence were shown. Several courts have come for-
ward recently and allowed causes of action when the infant has
obviously been damaged through the fault of another, prior to the
infant's conception.
These courts have recognized that to deny recovery on such
bases as public policy, lack of precedent, or speculative damages, is
merely a way of avoiding the issues that need to be confronted.
The infants in these cases have been injured severely. Public
policy demands that those responsible for such injuries bear the
burden of compensating these infants for the damages with which
they have been born. It is necessary that more courts in the future
follow this precedent so the infants may be allowed the recovery
they deserve. "The concept of the right of every child to be
physically, mentally and emotionally 'well-born' is fundamental to
human dignity."8'
Dawn R. Duven '78
81. J. PRITCHARD & P. McDONALD, WILLIAM'S OBSTETRICS 8 (15th ed. 1976).
